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Assurance cases are used to document an argument that
a system—such as a critical software system—satisfies some
desirable property (e.g., safety, security, or reliability). Demon-
strating high confidence that the claims made based on an
assurance case can be trusted is crucial to the success of the
case. Researchers have proposed quantification of confidence as
a Baconian probability ratio of eliminated concerns about the
assurance case to the total number of identified concerns. In
this paper, we extend their work by mapping this discrete ratio
to a continuous probability distribution—a beta distribution—
enabling different visualizations of the confidence in a claim.
Further, the beta distribution allows us to quantify and visualize
the uncertainty associated with the expressed confidence. Ad-
ditionally, by transforming the assurance case into a reasoning
structure, we show how confidence calculations can be performed
using beta distributions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Assurance cases are structured logical arguments that are
used to document how a claim is supported by evidence.
Assurance cases are becoming increasingly popular, especially
in safety-critical areas such as medical devices and civil
aviation. A well-argued assurance case can be used to show
that a system satisfies desirable properties such as safety
(thus becoming a safety case), reliability, or security. The UK
Ministry of Defence describes a safety case as:
“A structured argument, supported by a body of
evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible
and valid case that a system is safe for a given
application in a given operating environment.” [1].
In the United States, manufacturers of certain medical
devices that seek FDA approval must show that they are safe
through, among other things, the use of an assurance case.
The preparation of the assurance case demonstrates that the
manufacturer has considered how various pieces of evidence
such as testing results, pre-clinical trials, user studies, and
documentation support a claim of safety. The reviewer must
now decide, given all supporting information, if he or she
agrees with with the manufacturer. An important factor in this
This work has been partially supported by NSF grants CNS-0931931 and
CNS-1035715.
process is the amount of confidence the reviewer has in the
evidence given and on how the assurance case has been pre-
pared and structured. Being able to evaluate this confidence in
some systematic way is crucial to the evaluation of assurance
cases. While the process has a certain subjectiveness due to
differences in reviewers, it is our hope that such a systematic
approach will bring a consistency to the results.
Hawkins et al. [9] introduced a qualitative approach to
establishing confidence in an assurance case. They proposed
the concept of an assured safety argument—an assurance case
and its corresponding confidence case. The confidence case
is based on arguing the sufficiency of the implications in an
assurance case written in a graphical notation like GSN [12].
The crux of their approach is to find assurance deficits—
anything that could reduce one’s confidence in the assurance
case—and argue why these are acceptable.
Goodenough et al. [5] extend Hawkins et al.’s work by
quantifying confidence as a Baconian probability. This ratio
is derived from inductive reasoning—increasing confidence
through increased knowledge. This Baconian probability ratio
is a pair of integers frequently written in a fractional notation
for convenience. The number of assurance deficits (“doubts”
or “defeaters”) that have been eliminated or mitigated is
the numerator-like value while the total number of doubts
identified is the denominator-like value. The Baconian proba-
bilities are then summed up the assurance case to result in a
confidence probability value for the entire assurance case.
We extend the work of Hawkins et al. and Goodenough
et al. by quantifying and visualizing the Baconian probability
with the beta distribution. The beta distribution can take on
a variety of shapes and usually has the range 0 − 1, making
it ideal for probabilities. It has two parameters, α and β, that
affect the shape and scale of the distribution. As α and β
increase, the variance of the graph decreases. Increasing α
shifts the mode of the distribution to the right (towards 1)
while increasing β shifts the mode of the distribution to the
left (towards 0). When α and β are equal, the distribution is
symmetric. The number of doubts eliminated can be mapped
directly onto the α parameter and the number of doubts
remaining can be mapped directly onto the β parameter. Intu-
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itively, this makes sense—as the number of doubts eliminated
grows, so does our confidence. We then can use properties
of the beta distribution to calculate the uncertainty. Instead of
simply summing up the Baconian probability values, however,
we propose a weighting scheme with the beta distribution
parameters and a logical restructuring of the assurance case
to make a more intuitive argument. The use of the beta
distribution also allows us to use Jøsang’s opinion triangle [10]
as an additional visualization tool. Jøsang introduces a direct
mapping from the beta distribution to the opinion triangle
and back via subjective logic. The opinion triangle visualizes
an opinion on an intuitive three-dimensional scale of belief,
disbelief, and uncertainty. According to Habib et al. [8], the
opinion triangle is “very well suited for analysis done by
experts,” which fits what we are proposing. Although they
ultimately conclude that a different trust analysis system is
more intuitive for the lay person, the opinion triangle will be
apt in our case.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We will go into a bit of background related to assurance
cases, relevant approaches to evaluating confidence in assur-
ance cases, and the beta distribution. Additionally, we will
highlight relevant related work.
Figure 1 is a sample assurance case which seeks to show that
radiation over the standard amount (henceforth, overradiation)
will not occur with an x-ray backscattering machine, similar
to what one might see at an airport. For illustrative purposes,
this assurance case is very small. Our sample assurance
case follows the GSN notation [12], a popular approach to
writing assurance cases that has been adopted by a variety of
companies in Europe [6].
In our sample assurance case, we have a top-level claim
(G1) that “All causes of overradiation have been eliminated” in
the system. This claim is supported by the argument strategy,
S1, “Argument over all identified causes.” Our assumption,
that all causes of overradiation have been identified, serves as
the context (C1) for our argument. Our argument is supported
by two sub-claims, G2, “Software operating as intended,” and
G3, “Timer interlock operating correctly.” From this figure,
we can see that G2 is supported by two pieces of evidence
(solutions), Sn1 (Formal verification results) and Sn2 (Testing
results), and G3 is supported by two pieces of evidence, Sn3
(Fault Tree Analysis) and Sn4 (Testing results). The question
that we must then answer is, given the four pieces of evidence,
and this argument structure claiming that the evidence supports
the top-level claim, how much confidence can we have in this
assurance case?
A reviewer looking at this assurance case would need to
establish a confidence level for the case, whether implicitly or
explicitly. Duan et al. provide a general survey that summa-
rizes various approaches to evaluating confidence in assurance
cases [3].
G1







Argument over all identified causes
G2
Software operating as 
intended
G3














Fig. 1: An example of an assurance case
A. Assured Safety Argument
Hawkins et al. [9] introduces the idea of an assured safety
argument, an assurance case accompanied by a corresponding
confidence case. The confidence case seeks to address all
uncertainties that may exist in the assurance case. This purely
qualitative approach claims that one can arrive at consistent
and reasonable conclusions given a systematic approach.
The assurance case and the confidence case are connected
through three types of assurance claim points, or ACP. An
ACP exists between a claim or argument and a context, a
claim and an argument, and a claim and a solution (evidence).
Each ACP has a corresponding confidence case which is
meant to strengthen and argue why the connection is valid
and necessary.
The general approach to creating confidence cases is to
identify assurance deficits in the argument—anything that can
reduce our confidence in the assurance case. Then, we try to
eliminate those. Any that have not been eliminated readily
become a “residual assurance deficit.” These must be argued
further, by showing that they are acceptable either because they
will not severely impact that top-level claim or that significant
counter-evidence against them does not exist.
B. Baconian Probabilities
Goodenough et al. [5] proposed the idea of using inductive
reasoning, as introduced by Francis Bacon, to quantify the
confidence one has in an assurance case. The general premise
is that when evaluating an assurance case, one comes up with
a list of “defeaters” or “doubts”—anything that might cause
one to decrease confidence in the assurance case. This is
similar to the assurance deficit idea that Hawkins et al. used.
Example sources of doubt could be credibility of the testing,
validity of the results, trustworthiness of the testers, or quality
of documentation. For example, suppose we have identified
all assurance deficits for evidence node Sn1—there are 10
of them—and thus have 10 sources of doubt. Then, we go
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through each doubt and eliminate it by resolving or mitigating
it—for example, 8 doubts have been eliminated—or decide
it cannot be eliminated—2 doubts remain unresolved. These
unresolved doubts are similar to the residual assurance deficits
mentioned by Hawkins et al. The confidence one has in an
assurance case is then represented as a Baconian probability—
a ratio of the number of doubts eliminated to the total number
of doubts. This ratio is irreducible, as 45 would represent an
entirely different confidence value than 810—the latter shows
a higher confidence value and indicates that more doubts had
been found and ultimately mitigated or eliminated.
Figure 2 shows our sample assurance case with example
Baconian probability values and how they would be combined,
by summing up the assurance case, to arrive at a final
confidence value for the entire case.
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Fig. 2: Assurance case with sample Baconian probabilities
C. Dempster-Shafer Theory
Dempster-Shafer theory seeks to reason about uncertainty
by quantifying confidence (or belief) as a mass value. This
mass value, which is between 0 and 1, grows as our confidence
grows. The confidence value can exist on a range bounded by
belief on the lower end and plausibility on the upper end.
Existing information is used to find the boundaries of this
possible range.
What makes Dempster-Shafer theory unique is that it sep-
arates out uncertainty from belief and disbelief. Uncertainty
is treated explicitly as the quantity left over after belief
and disbelief have been accounted for. Jøsang visualizes this
concept as an opinion triangle, as seen in Figure 3 (a). An
opinion, ω, is represented by three parameters—belief (b),
disbelief (d), and uncertainty (u), on this bounded, triangular
plane.
Cyra and Gorski [2] use Dempster-Shafer theory, the opin-
ion triangle, and Toulmin’s argumentation theory [13] in their
calculations and visualizations of confidence in assurance
cases. Figure 4 shows our sample assurance case as visualized
Fig. 3: Jøsang’s Opinion Triangle
by the tool created by Cyra and Gorski. The left side shows
the text-style assurance case as espoused by Cyra and Gorski.
Similar to GSN, it has a top level claim, a context for that
claim, an argument for the entire assurance case, subclaims,
and pieces of evidence (solutions). The biggest change from
GSN is the requirement of a justification for the argument.
On the right, we see how users can choose to set confidence
and decision ratings for different components of the assurance
case.
D. Beta Distribution
The beta distribution is part of “a most flexible family of
distributions” [7], a continuous version of the binomial distri-
bution on the range from 0 to 1, making it very appropriate
for modeling probabilities. It is popular for use in Bayesian





Its probability density function (pdf) is described by two




xα−1(1− x)β−1, 0 < x < 1 (2)
where α > 0, β > 0, and B(α, β) is the beta function.
When α and β are both 1, beta(1, 1) is the uniform distribu-
tion. When α and β are equal, the beta distribution models an
approximate Gaussian shape. When α and β are both less than
1, the beta distribution takes a “U” shape, with the special case
of beta(0.5, 0.5) being the arc-sine distribution [7]. When β is
1, the distribution takes on a power shape. When α and β are
both greater than 1 and not equal, the beta distribution takes
on a skewed Gaussian shape, where the mean and mode of
the curve are not equal. Figure 5 shows some of these shapes.
As α increases while β stays the same, the peak of the
curve shifts to the right. This increase can viewed as more
positive information incoming, such as with reviews. Each
review increases our α value, and increases our trust while
also reducing the uncertainty due to the fact that we have more
information. As β increases while α stays the same, the peak
of the curve shifts to the left. This movement can be viewed as
more negative information incoming, such as negative reviews
that reduce our trust, but also reduce uncertainty. As α or
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Fig. 4: Assurance case and assessment example using Argevide Nor-Sta
Fig. 5: Sample beta distribution shapes
β increases, the maximum value of the peak increases while
the uncertainty, or variance of the curve, decreases. This can
be viewed as knowledge being increased, thereby reducing
uncertainty or ignorance.
Josang [11] provides a mapping between his opinion
triangle and the beta distribution, as seen in Figure 3.
This mapping depends on the values of belief, disbelief,
uncertainty, and the prior belief value, a known quan-
tity with no uncertainty. In Figure 3, we have an opin-
ion {belief, disbelief, uncertainty} of {0.7, 0.1, 0.2}, which
translates to a beta distribution with parameters beta(8, 2). We
can see in the opinion triangle that this opinion has fairly
high belief and low disbelief, but also has a fair amount of
uncertainty. These facts are reflected in the beta distribution
with a peak around 0.8, but quite a high variance.
Duan et al. [4] first proposed the use of the beta distribution
to represent confidence in assurance cases. This paper extends
that work with an application of the beta distribution with
Baconian probabilities, the use of a weighting scale, and a
more formal approach to restructuring the assurance case into
a logical argument.
III. TECHNICAL APPROACH
A. Visualization of Confidence
The beta distribution can be used to visualize the Baconian
probability (nd ) representing confidence. One can view the α
parameter of the beta distribution as representing the number
of doubts that have been eliminated—increasing our confi-
dence and decreasing our uncertainty. The β parameter would
represent the number of doubts that still remain (the numerator
subtracted from the denominator)—items that would reduce
our confidence while also decreasing our uncertainty.
When all the doubts have been eliminated in Baconian
probability, the numerator and denominator components are
equal and we have full confidence. As visualized by a beta
distribution, the β parameter is 0, and we would have a
discontinuity (spike) at 1. For a Baconian probability value
of 1630 , we would get the corresponding α and β values of
beta(16, 14).
Assuming n is the Baconian numerator and d is the Baco-
nian denominator, the mapping is thus:
α = n (3)
β = d− n (4)
Figure 6 shows the beta distributions as mapped from
Baconian probability values for each of the evidence nodes,
Sn1 (beta(5, 1)), Sn2 (beta(6, 1)), Sn3 (beta(2, 6)), and Sn4
(beta(3, 6)). The distributions for each node are given in
different colors and line styles. We see that for Sn1 and
Sn2, which only have one defeater each, the graph is a low-
sloped J-shape. Sn2 has a higher slope than Sn1, due to the
extra information that exists for it. Sn3 and Sn4 have their
modes more in the left side of the graph, reflecting our low
confidence (or higher disbelief) in them. Figure 7 shows the
distributions for the evidence nodes Sn1 (beta(5, 1)) and Sn2
(beta(6, 1)), and the combination of the two, the confidence
for the software claim node G2 (beta(11, 2)). We see that the
additional defeater minimizes the ability for our confidence
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to be at 1, but the disbelief is also reduced slightly. Figure 8
shows the distributions for the evidence nodes Sn3 (beta(2, 6))
and Sn4 (beta(3, 6)), and the combination of the two, the
confidence for the hardware claim node G3 (beta(5, 12)). The
combination graph has a higher peak and lower uncertainty
than the two component graphs, and its mode is situated
between the two, as one would expect. Lastly, Figure 9 shows
the distributions for the software node (beta(11, 2)) and the
hardware node (beta(5, 12)), and the combination of the two,
the confidence for the overradiation node, G1, and the entire
assurance case (beta(16, 14)). We see that when combining
two very disparate graphs, we arrive at a distribution almonst
evenly between the two. These examples show the added
richness of understanding that is provided when visualizing
the Baconian probability ratio as a beta distribution.
Fig. 6: Beta distributions for confidence in the evidence nodes
Sn1 - Sn4
Fig. 7: Beta distributions for confidence in the software node
G2
By using the beta distribution, we explicitly add a third
dimension of information that did not previously exist in
the Baconian approach—the separation out of uncertainty.
Uncertainty in the beta distribution can be calculated as the
difference between the two inflection points of the curve. This
Fig. 8: Beta distributions for confidence in the hardware node
G3
Fig. 9: Beta distributions for confidence in the overradiation
node G1
gives a specific, quantifiable value to uncertainty that can aid
in assessment. The calculation for the inflection points of the
beta distribution is:
α− 1
α+ β − 2 ±
1
α+ β − 2
√
(α− 1)(β − 1)
α+ β − 3 (5)
Note that when α or β is equal to one, the inflection points
are both either 0 or 1, respectively, so Eq. 5 cannot be used to
calculate an uncertainty value. In such a situation, we propose
an alternative method for evaluating uncertainty. Two times
the distance from 0 (for α) or 1 (for β) of the expected value




should to be used. The inflection points of the beta distribution
are approximately located on either side of expected value. But
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with a J-shaped graph like we see when α or β is 1, we don’t
have inflection points—the slope is constantly increasing as
it gets closer and closer to 0 or 1, respectively. The expected
value, which can be viewed as the center of the distribution,
would then give us a measure of how far from either extreme
most of the data is centered. We then multiply this value by
2 to account for the two inflection points that exist otherwise.
Table I shows the uncertainty values for the evidence nodes.
An additional visualization tool is available with the use
of the beta distribution. Introduced by Josang [10], it is
called an opinion triangle, a triangle whose vertices represent
belief (right bottom corner), disbelief (left bottom corner),
and uncertainty (top corner). Josang developed a mapping
between the beta distribution and the opinion triangle, via the
use of subjective logic [11]. Figure 10 shows our Baconian
probability value of 1630 (represented by a beta distribution of
beta(16, 14)) as plotted on Jøsang’s opinion triangle. We can
see that we have fairly low uncertainty, due to the quantity
of information, but our information is a bit conflicting, so
we are almost at the middle between disbelief and belief. A
reviewer examining this assurance case with a confidence of
a Baconian probability ratio of 1630 will then have two options
for visualizing this confidence value beyond the numerical
values given in the table—either as the central beta distribution
from Figure 9 or as the dot on the opinion triangle in
Figure 10. Even though the distribution seemed to have a
high uncertainty, from the opinion triangle we can see that it is
actually not so high as to cause alarm. We can also clearly see,
from the triangle, how evenly divided we are in the opinion.
Fig. 10: Baconian probability example on an opinion triangle
B. Weighting Scheme
In Goodenough et. al.’s approach, any uncertainty that exists
is accounted for in the doubts that have accumulated. These
doubts only exist at the leaf level of the assurance case—
the evidence nodes—and to find a confidence value for the
entire case, one simply sums up the tree structure (as seen in
Figure 2).
We, however, believe that simple addition will not be
enough for calculating a final confidence value. This is be-
cause there are factors that have not been accounted for—for
example, the assurance case structure might not be correct,
or one evidence should have more importance (weight) than
another one. As an example for the latter, suppose two of
the sources of doubts we have for Sn2: Testing Results are
(1) whether or not proper documentation was employed, and
(2) all the tests have passed to a statement coverage criteria,
instead of a higher standard such as MC/DC. It is unrealistic
to put equal weights to these two sources of doubts, as (2) is
more important than (1).
We propose a weighting scheme for such a situation, to
be applied to the parameters of the beta distribution for each
of the evidence nodes. The weighting scheme will have five
options: very low impact (scale by 0.5), low impact (scale
by 0.75), medium (default) impact (scale by 1.0) , high
impact (scale by 1.5), and very high impact (scale by 2.0).
Each evidence node should have a corresponding weight, or
importance, which will figure into ultimate calculations. Each
sub-claim node should also have a corresponding weight.
Figure 11 shows sample weights for our Baconian probability
assurance case. We have deemed the software branch of the
assurance case to have more weight than the hardware branch,
and have weighted the various nodes according. As such, even
though we have low confidence in the hardware node, the
fact that we have high confidence in the software node should
be more important. Figure 12 shows the beta distribution for
the top-level claim for both the original Baconian probability
values (red, dotted line) and the weighted Baconian probability
values (blue, solid line). We can see that, as expected, the
weighted distribution has a peak at a higher confidence value,
reflecting the higher confidence we have in the assurance case
due to the weighting system. As a result of our weighting
system, we no longer have integers for the confidence values.
This is a fairly trivial concern—the beta distribution has no
such limit on whether its parameters are integers or reals,
and our use of the Baconian probability only extends to the
evidence nodes.
C. Combination of Evidence and Uncertainty
When analyzing the way confidence is combined in an
assurance case, we can switch to a fault tree analysis-like
structure to aid us. We are thus no longer limited to the
straightforward addition approach as used by Goodenough
et al. We call this a reasoning structure. Depending on the
assurance case, evidence can be combined with an AND or OR
operator (and in the future, others as needed). An OR operator
would not be accurately represented by simple addition, which
would disproportionately favor the weaker argument.
For an assurance case, we want to make an argument over all
causes, so each branch needs to be evaluated carefully, because
we seek to make the strongest argument possible. When eval-
uating the confidence, however, the argument structure could
be changed, because, depending on the reasoning structure,
confidence in only one branch would be enough.
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TABLE I: Uncertainty values calculated from the beta distribution
Node Name α β Expected Value Inflection Point 1 Inflection Point 2 Uncertainty
Sn1 Formal verification results 5 1 0.833 1 1 0.333
Sn2 Testing results 6 1 0.857 1 1 0.286
Sn3 Fault Tree Analysis 2 6 0.25 0.333 0 0.333
Sn4 Testing results 3 6 0.333 0.470 0.101 0.369
G2 Software node 11 2 0.846 1 0.818 0.182
G3 Hardware node 5 12 0.294 0.385 0.148 0.236
G1 Overradiation node 16 14 0.533 0.632 0.440 0.192
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Fig. 11: Assurance case with Baconian probabilities and
weights
Fig. 12: Beta distributions for weighted evidence nodes
As an example, consider our assurance case with Baconian
probability values assigned to the nodes as seen in Figure 2.
The timer interlock (hardware) branch has a lot of doubts that
have not been eliminated, so it has a very low confidence
value of 517 . If we continued with the Baconian approach,
we would have a moderate confidence value of 1630 for the
entire assurance case. Such a (comparedly) low confidence
value would not give one much confidence in the system being
assured. Figure 9 shows the Baconian probability values for
the software, hardware, and overradiation nodes as converted
to beta distribution parameters and then plotted. We see that
one branch has high confidence (mode of graph is shifted to
the right) while the other branch has low confidence (mode of
graph is shifted to the left), resulting in a medium confidence
for the assurance case.
We can, however, change the assurance case into our
reasoning structure (Figure 13). The conversion requires one
to analyze the specific situation and see what kind of reasoning
structure should best be used. In our case, for overradiation
to occur, we would need a failure in both the software and
the hardware components. However, since our claim is that
“No overradiation will occur,” and we know that there is an
existing redundancy system in place where both components
have to fail for overradiation to occur, we just need to have
enough confidence in one branch not failing to have enough
confidence in the whole assurance case—thus, we use an OR
argument. No overradiation will occur if the software does
not fail or the hardware does not fail (or neither fails). The
new beta distributions for the logical argumentation structure
is shown in Figure 14. We can see that now we have fairly high
confidence in the assurance case, reflecting our confidence
in the redundancy system that exists in the x-ray machine.
In normal probability, a logical-OR construct has a higher
probability of occurence than either of its components. By
choosing the branch in which we have the highest confidence,
we are actually taking a conservative approach to ensure that
we have at least accounted for a minimum possible confidence
value.
IV. CONCLUSION
Assurance cases have become increasing popular in areas of
safety-critical systems. Being able to capture the confidence
and uncertainty one has in an assurance case in a quantifiable
way is extremely helpful. We have introduced a way of
visualizing the Baconian probability method of representing
confidence in an assurance case with the use of the beta
distribution and the opinion triangle and provided an example
7
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Fig. 13: Logical Argument for Example Assurance Case
Fig. 14: Beta distribution representation of Baconian proba-
bilities in the logical argument structure
of its use. Additionally, we have established a method to
calculate the uncertainty associated with an evidence node of
an assurance case based on the inflection points and expected
values of the beta distribution. These approaches will give
a sound, mathematical basis to calcuating uncertainty. We
also introduced a weighting scheme to make calculations of
confidences more realistic. Lastly, we introduced a reasoning
structure to better combine confidences for different nodes of
an assurance case. It is our hope that these approaches will
provide a clearer, more consistent method of quantifying con-
fidence and uncertainty for an assurance case. Our future work
will seek to further clarify and codify the set of “rules” for
our approach, as well as provide a more objective evaluation
of the claims.
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